In this paper, a secure and fast chaotic image encryption scheme with simultaneous permutation-diffusion operation is proposed. We combine permutation and diffusion processes into a whole, namely, simultaneous permutation and diffusion operation (SPDO). This can solve the problem of traditional encryption scheme in which the permutation and diffusion are two independent processes, that leads attackers to crack the two processes separately. In SPDO, the initial value of the current Sine-Sine chaotic map is related to the secret keys and the previous encrypted pixels' values. In this case, the proposed scheme can generate dynamic key streams and indexes that are related to plaintext, which improves the sensitivity to plaintext for the encryption scheme. In addition, the pixel values are processed by row and column (rowlevel and column-level) during the encryption procedure. Thus, the proposed scheme presents lower time complexity and faster running speed compared with bit-level or pixel-level image encryption schemes, which makes the proposed scheme be conducive to the batch transmission and real-time transmission of digital images. The simulation results and security analysis show that our scheme can resist common attacks, such as statistical attack, differential attack, chosen plaintext attack and other comprehensive attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the wide application of information technology, secure and efficient transmissions of digital images capture the attention of researchers. It is noted that images have some intrinsic features, such as high redundancy, bulk data capacity, and strong correlation. Therefore, the encryption effect of digital image is unsatisfactory by using traditional encryption technologies, such as DES and AES [1] , [2] . When designing image encryption schemes, we must not only ensure the security of the transmission, but also take into account the encryption speed.
In recent years, a large number of image encryption schemes based on chaos [4] - [7] , [15] - [32] , [34] - [47] have been proposed, due to some inherent features of chaotic system such as noise-like, ergodicity and extreme sensitivity to initial parameters [3] , [33] , [48] - [50] . For example, Wang et al. [4] used the Logistic map in image encryption. Pak and The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Qiang Lai .
Huang [5] constructed a new one-dimensional chaotic system to permute and diffuse the image pixels' value. Saljoughi and Mirvaziri [6] encrypted the values of the image pixels by applying three nonlinear chaotic sequences (threedimensional Logistic maps). Luo et al. [7] used the piecewise linear chaotic map and four-dimensional hyper-chaotic map in their parallel image encryption scheme. The above encryption algorithms are traditional permutation-diffusion architecture (they are two separated stages and not related to the plaintext) as depicted in [8] , which is vulnerable to be cracked by using chosen plaintext attack. For example, Tu et al. [9] and Wang et al. [10] cracked the diffusion process and the permutation process of the encryption schemes presented in [4] , [5] respectively by developing chosen plaintext attack. Accordingly, in order to resist chosen plaintext attack, a lot of encryption schemes related to plaintext [11] , [12] , [28] - [32] are proposed. For example, in [11] , the keystream is designed dependent upon the sum of pixels' squares of the plain image. In [12] , the keystream of the permutation process is related to the sum of pixel values of the plain image, and the keystream of the diffusion process is related to the selected nine pixel values of the permuted image in fixed positions. In [13] , the secret matrix of the diffusion process is related to the pixel value of the plain image in secret location. However, the plaintext-related encryption schemes with the separated permutation-diffusion architecture can also be cracked by using chosen plaintext attack. For example, Liu et al. [14] cracked the scheme [12] by developing twice chosen plaintext attacks. They cracked the diffusion process by constructing a special image, and the nine-pixel values of the permuted image of the special image in fixed positions are identical with those in the cipher image. Then they cracked the permutation process by the obtained permuted image. Fan et al. [15] cracked the encryption scheme [13] by applying seven times chosen plaintext attacks. Firstly, they calculated the secret location by selecting two images with the same pixel sum. Secondly, they obtained the diffusion process by calculating the secret matrix. Finally, they cracked the permutation process by using the obtained secret matrix and the chosen special image and then recovered the plain image.
In order to resist the separated attack, image encryption schemes based on SPDO are presented in [16] - [18] . In [16] , the permutation and diffusion processes are combined into one stage. Therefore, the attackers cannot crack the permutation and diffusion process independently and then the scheme can resist the separated attack. In addition, the encryption algorithm needs two rounds to achieve the desired encryption effect. In [17] , the author permuted and diffused the pixel values simultaneously by using modified Logistic chaotic map. When a pixel value is processed, the chaotic map is iterated once again. If a size M × N image is encrypted, the chaotic map needs to be re-iterated M × N times. The encryption scheme can resist the separated attack and relieve the dynamic degradation problem [19] , but it costs amounts of time for multi-image transmission. In [18] , the pixels' values were encrypted by being converted into a pixel-cube. The scheme provides a single permutation-diffusion operation, in which the pixels' indexes are determined by the chaotic map, and the current encrypting pixel's value is related to the previous ciphertext. The encryption scheme has excellent security capacity and can resist the separated attack. However, the scheme has high time complexity and its encryption speed may not meet the requirements of real-time transmission. In addition, the first selected encrypted pixel value depends on the sum of pixel values of the plain image and chaotic maps, which prevents the first selected encrypted pixel value from being restored to its original value in decryption process.
In this paper, in order to overcome the above problems, especially in the security and speed, we proposed a new image encryption scheme. The contributions and novelties of the proposed scheme are as follows: (1) Our scheme can resist the separated attack and chosen plaintext attack, such as the attack methods in [9] , [10] , [14] . The reason is the permutation and diffusion operations are implemented simultaneously by using Sine-Sine chaotic map. In addition, the initial value of the current Sine-Sine chaotic map is related to the previous encrypted pixels (details can be seen in step 2 of Section III.B and III.C), which leads to the generation of dynamic keystreams related to the plaintext. (2) The proposed scheme has low time complexity and fast encryption speed. Since the pixel values are processed by row and column (rowlevel or column-level) during the whole encryption process, the proposed algorithm has better performance in speed than that of some existing simultaneous mechanism of scrambling and diffusion to implement fast image encryption algorithms such as [17] and [18] in which the pixel values are processed by pixel-level. The test results in IV show that our scheme is superior to other image encryption schemes (such as the scheme in [7] , [11] , [17] , [18] ) with regard to security performance, encryption effect and speed.
The rest of our paper is arranged as follows: In Section II, we introduce the applied chaotic maps. Section III presents the proposed scheme in detail. The simulation results and the security analysis of the proposed encryption scheme are discussed in Section IV. Finally, we make a comprehensive summary for the article in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARY WORK
In this part, two chaotic maps employed in the proposed encryption scheme are described in detail. Since classical one-dimensional chaotic maps such as Logistic map [4] , Hénon map [20] , Lorenz system [21] and Tent map [22] have several flaws such as small key spaces and limited chaotic ranges, we employ the 2D Hénon-Sine map proposed in [23] and the Sine-Sine map proposed in [5] for generating the random sequences in the proposed scheme.
A. 2D HÉNON-SINE MAP
2D Hénon -Sine map (2D-HSM) was proposed by Wu et al. [23] , which can be described by Eq. (1):
where the ranges of parameters a and b are both expanded to (−∞, +∞), and the initial values of the 2D-HSM map x 0 , y 0 ∈ (0, 1). From the bifurcation diagram presented in Figure 1 (a), 2D-HSM has wider chaotic range. In addition, it has been proved in [23] that 2D-HSM has better ergodicity and randomness than Hénon map and Sine map. Therefore, 2D-HSM possesses complex trajectories and more unpredictable output results.
B. SINE-SINE MAP
Pak [5] proposed the Sine-Sine map based on Sine map, which can be described by Eq. (2):
where parameter u ∈ (0, 10), and the initial value of the Sine-Sine map z 0 ∈ (0, 1). From the bifurcation diagram shown in Figure 1 (b), Sine-Sine map has wide chaotic range and random outputs. The features of the 2D-HSM and Sine-Sine map can be summarized as:
(1) The chaotic ranges of the two maps are much larger than that of the common one-dimension maps, such as Logistic map, Hénon map, Sine map and so on, which makes the proposed encryption method have large secret keys space.
(2) The Lyapunov exponents of the two maps are approximate to 2 can match that of common hyperchaotic maps such as [20] . The two maps have good chaotic performance, complex trajectories and well randomness.
(3) The two chaotic maps have simple structures and they are easy to be implemented by software and hardware. In addition, they have less execution time than that of hyperchaotic maps, which is suitable for fast encryption.
Therefore, we employ 2D-HSM and Sine-Sine map for image encryption.
III. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
In this section, our encryption process is described in detail. Ten parameters (x 0 , y 0 , z 01 , z 02 , N 0 , C 0 , t 0 , u, a, b) are the secret keys. The proposed encryption process includes three main parts: rewriting the plain image's pixel values by 2D-HSM, SPDO by row, and SPDO by column. The proposed architecture for image encryption is shown in Figure 2 .
A. REWRITE PIXELS' VALUES OF THE PLAIN IMAGE P BY 2D-HSM
The rewriting steps are as follows.
Step 1: Iterate the 2D-HSM [23] by Eq.(1) (N 0 +max(m, n)) times to get two chaotic sequences (x i , y j : 1 ≤ i ≤ N 0 + max(m, n)). Note: m × n is the size of the plain image.
Step 2: The former N 0 elements are discarded to obtain two new random sequences (h i , l j : 1 ≤ i ≤ n,1 ≤ j ≤ m) according to Eq.(3):
where the sequence h i is used for row-rewriting with the length n and the sequence l j is used for column-rewriting with the length m.
Step 3: Rewriting operation by Eq. (4):
where R represents the row-rewritten image and Q represents the column-rewritten image. In essence, each pixel' value of the plain image is added different numbers in two rounds during the rewriting operation, which makes the encryption results more random and unpredictable.
B. THE SPDO BY ROW
The diagram of SPDO by row is shown in Figure 3 .
Step 1: Set i = 1.
Step 2: Iterate Sine-Sine map [5] by Eq.(2) (N 0 + n) times and cut off the first N 0 elements to obtain a new random sequences with size of n. The initial value z i of the Sine-Sine map is calculated according to Eq.(5)-Eq. (7).
where z 01 , C 0 , N 0 are initial parameters, and sum is the sum of the previous cipher row-pixel values, which indicates that the initial value of the Sine-Sine map is influenced by the secret keys and the previous cipher pixels. Therefore, our scheme generates distinct keystreams for different plain images.
Step 3: The row index n i of pixels to be processed is calculated by Eq.(8) and Eq. (9) .
where t i ∈ [1, n] . When the chaotic system is re-iterated, a new n i is obtained in Eq. (8) . n i is dynamically updated and distributed roughly uniformly from 1 to m. Namely,
Step 4: Compute the sequence D i for diffusion according to Eq.(10):
where j ∈ (1, n). D i is distinct for different plain images.
Step 5: Encrypt the n th i row pixels of the image according to Eq.(11):
where C(T i , :) are the previous encrypted and swapped rowpixel values.
Step 6: Swap the encrypted pixels C n i and pixels C T i+1 for permutation according to Eq. (12):
Step 7: Set i = i + 1 and repeat the above steps (in Section III.B) until all row-pixel values of the image are processed. 
C. THE SPDO BY COLUMN
The diagram of SPDO by column is shown in Figure 4 .
Step 1: Set j = 1.
Step 2: Iterate Sine-Sine map [5] in Eq.(2) (N 0 + n) times and cut off the first N 0 elements to obtain a new random sequences with size of m. The initial value z j of the Sine-Sine map is calculated according to Eq.(13)-Eq. (15):
T j = (n − j + 2)mod(n + 1)
where z 02 is initial parameter, and sum is the sum of the previous cipher column-pixel values. Eq. (13)-Eq. (15) state that the initial value of the Sine-Sine map depends on the secret key and the previous cipher pixels, which can generate distinct keystreams for different plain images.
Step 3: The column index n j of pixels to be processed is calculated according to Eq.(16) and Eq. (17).
where t j ∈ [1, m] . When the chaotic system is re-iterated, a new n j is obtained in Eq. (16) . n j is dynamically updated and distributed roughly uniformly from 1 to m. Namely,
Step 4 is the same as Step 4 in Section III.B above.
Step 5: Encrypt the n th j column pixels of the image according to Eq.(18):
where C(:,T j ) are the previous encrypted and swapped column-pixel values.
Step 6: Swap the encrypted pixels C n j and pixels C T j+1 for permutation according to Eq. (19):
Step 7: Set j = j + 1 and repeat the above steps (in Section III.C) until all column-pixel values of the image are processed. Finally, the cipher image C can be obtained.
Similarly, the steps of decryption procedure are the inverse steps of the encryption procedure. The plain image can be completely restored by decryption operation with the same secret key.
The following characteristics of the proposed encryption scheme should be noticed.
(i) The information of the plain image can be completely hidden after rewriting operation, and then the pixel values of the n th 1 row (Section III.B) are covered before SPDO which is only related to the secret key, so that the attacker is failed to crack the proposed encryption scheme with all-zeroes image or other special images such as [9] , [10] .
(ii) Our scheme can resist chosen plaintext attack. In Section III.B and Section III.C, when i = 1 or j = 1, the initial value of the Sine-Sine map is only related to the secret keys. When i ∈ [2, m] or j ∈ [2, n], the initial value of the Sine-Sine map is set to be related to the initial key and the ciphertext information obtained from the previous encryption. Therefore, distinct row or column indexes of image pixels and the sequences for diffusion are generated for different plain images (step 3 and step 4 in Section III.B and III.C), which greatly improves the safety performance of the proposed scheme.
(iii) The proposed encryption process is reversible. Because the new generated index n i (step 3 in Section III.B) or n j (step 3 in Section III.C) is smaller than the row index T i+1 (step 2 in Section III.B) or column index T j+1 (step 2 in Section III.C) of the swapped pixels, so the pixels' value will not change after permutation. Importantly, the sequences sum(step 2 in Section III.B and III.C), which determine the initial value of the Sine-Sine map, will be equal in the encryption and decryption process. Therefore, the corresponding plain image can be recovered successfully by the decryption process.
(iv) The plain image is encrypted by row and column (rowlevel and column-level) in the proposed scheme, which is faster than that in bit-level [7] , [24] and pixel-level [11] , [25] .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the section, ten gray-scale plain images (Lena, Mandril, Cameraman, Living-room, Pirate, Woman, Truck, Peppers, Resolution, Barbana) are tested. The proposed scheme is related to plaintext and based on SPDO, therefore, the following experiments compare the proposed scheme with four related schemes presented in Luo et al. [7] , Ye et al. [11] , Diab [17] , Huang et al. [18] .
The test images presented in the first column of Figure 5 are encrypted by our scheme and the corresponding cipher images are shown in the second column of Figure 5 , which perfectly hide all the information of the plain images and present noise-like appearances. The decrypted images are displayed in the third column of Figure 5 , which are exactly the same as the corresponding plain images. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicability of our scheme.
A. KEY SPACE ANALYSIS
The secret key of the proposed scheme consists of ten parameters (x 0 , y 0 ,z 01 , z 02 ,N 0 , C 0 ,t 0 , u, a, b) shown in Table 1 , where x 0 , y 0 , z 01 , z 02 ∈ (0, 1], u ∈ (0, 10], C 0 , t 0 ∈ [0, 255], a, b ∈ (−∞, +∞), and N 0 = 10 3 . Then the key space of the proposed scheme is 10 98 × 10 3 × 256 × 256 ≈ 2 351 with the accuracy of 10 −14 . Therefore, our scheme can resist the brute-force attack.
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1) HISTOGRAM ANALYSIS
The results of the histogram test are shown in Figure 6 . The second column images of Figure 6 are the histograms of the plain images, and the last column images of Figure 6 are the histograms of the corresponding cipher images which are well-distributed. Therefore, our scheme is enough to resist statistical attacks.
2) CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS
To further illustrate the distribution of ciphertext pixel values, we calculate their chi-square values according to Eq. (20):
where K = 256 for gray-scale image, o i and e i represent the occurrence frequency of each gray value obtained from the experiment and the expected occurrence frequency of each gray value respectively. The results shown in Table 2 indicate that the chi-square values of the ciphertext image obtained by the proposed scheme are all less than the theoretical value 293.24783. Therefore, the ciphertext has a uniform distribution, and our scheme passes the chi-square test successfully.
3) CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF TWO ADJACENT PIXELS
We randomly select 10,000 pairs of adjacent pixels from the plain images and cipher images at horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions. The correlation coefficient is calculated according to Eq. (21):
where cov(x, y)
The correlation distributions from Lena gray-scale image and the corresponding cipher image are presented in Figure 7 . Evidently, there are no detectable correlation between adjacent pixels for the cipher image. In addition, the correlation coefficients of ten encrypted image using different encryption VOLUME 8, 2020 schemes are listed in Table 3 . These results show that our scheme can resist statistical attack.
C. KEY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we encrypt plain image 'Lena' with size 256× 256 by inputting the secret key (x 0 , y 0 , z 01 , z 02 , N 0 , C 0 , t 0 , u, a, b) , and decrypt the cipher image with the same secret key. In addition, we decrypt the cipher image with the modified secret keys respectively shown in Table 4 . The corresponding recovered images are displayed in Figure 8 . From the results, we can see the plain image cannot be recovered in the decryption process with slightly different secret keys. Therefore, the proposed scheme has strong key sensitivity. 
D. INFORMATION ENTROPY ANALYSIS
Information entropy is calculated according to Eq. (22):
where k is the image bit depth, e.g., k = 8 for an 8-bit grayscale image, and f (s i ) is the probability of s i . In our scheme, the use of two chaotic maps increases the randomness of ciphertext images, so the information entropy is high. According to the Table 5 , the information entropy of all cipher images is close to the theoretical value 8. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides high randomness.
In addition, we calculate the local information entropy according to Eq. (23):
where W (C i ) is the information entropy for each block of randomly selected encrypted image and can be calculated by Eq. (22) . As stated in [26] , parameters k and T b in this test are set to 30 and 1936 . The local information entropy values for gray-scale images with size 512 × 512 and a significance level α = 0.05 are shown in Table 6 . The results show that our scheme has better ability to resist the entropy attack [12] .
E. DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
To measure the ability of our scheme to resist differential attack, we calculate NPCR and UACI according to 
where the image C 1 is the cipher image of the plain image P 1 , and the image C 2 is the cipher image of the plain image P 2 differing in only one-bit from P 1 . We can see from the data in Table 7 that the NPCR and UACI values for the proposed scheme are very close to the ideal values 99.6094% and 33.4635% [25] , [28] respectively, which shows that the proposed scheme is extremely sensitive to slight differences of the plain image and then can resist differential attack.
F. SPEED AND TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In our scheme, the image pixel values are encrypted by row and column, which is faster than those are encrypted by bitlevel [7] , [24] or pixel-level [11] , [25] . Accordingly, the time complexity in the rewriting process of our scheme is θ(m+n), and the time complexity in the SPDO is also θ(m + n). So the complexity of the proposed scheme is θ (2 (m + n) ). For other related encryption schemes such as [7] , [11] , [17] , VOLUME 8, 2020 [18], the time complexity of them is more than θ(2 (m + n)).
And the complexity of our scheme is the same as that of the scheme in [16] . These are shown in Table 8 (where m × n is the size of the plain image). The running time for different plain images and different schemes are list in Table 9 . This shows that our scheme is faster than that of others [7] , [11] , [17] , [18] . In addition, the average time of decryption process in our scheme is 0.238547 seconds, which is faster than the scheme [29] with 3.525617 seconds. The experimental environment is MATLAB R2014b with Intel Core i5-4590 CPU @ 3.30GHz and 4.00 G RAM on window 7 OS.
G. RESISTANCE TO CHOSEN/KNOWN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
The proposed encryption scheme is based on SPDO. Accordingly, the attacker cannot separate the two processes and crack the permutation and diffusion rules respectively. In addition, there is a rewriting operation before SPDO, which leads the attacker not to find proper special images in the attack plan. Moreover, our algorithm will generate a distinct key-stream for different plain image in SPDO, so even if the attacker selected some special images to obtain the permutation and diffusion rules, our scheme cannot be broken since these rules are different for different plain images. In conclusion, the proposed encryption scheme can resist chosen and known plaintext attack.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a fast image encryption scheme based on SPDO. First of all, we permute and diffuse the pixel values simultaneously by row and column through Sine-Sine map, which can resist the separated attack. What's more, in SPDO, the initial value of the Sine-Sine map is related to the image information and the secret key, which generates distinct keystreams and index sequences for different plain images. The experimental results and security analysis demonstrate that the proposed encryption scheme has strong robustness against statistical attack, differential attack, chosen and known plaintext attack and other comprehensive attacks. Besides, the running speed of the proposed image encryption scheme (row-level and column-level) is faster than the existing encryption schemes based on SPDO [17] , [18] which is conducive to the batch transmission and real-time transmission of digital images. Therefore, our scheme can be well applied in digital image encryption. In future work, we focus on improving the proposed scheme to resist on noise and occlusion attack (in this paper we suppose the images are transmitted losslessly). When the cipher image is contaminated by noises or subtracted from a part of data in the process of transmission, the effective information (the sequences (sum) which determine the diffusion matrices and the row-index or column-index in SPDO) may be changed. In this case, we cannot perform inverse permutation and diffusion process correctly. In future work, we will focus on the design of image encryption algorithm which can resist noise and cropping attacks. One way is we can set the sequences (sum) as secret keys, but how to manage the huge amounts of secret keys and synchronize these secret keys to different plaintext images are still under research.
